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Over the next ten to fifteen years, the number of internet-enabled devices is 
anticipated to grow exponentially, which will magnify cyber risks across an expanding 
attack surface area. It is unclear whether current manual methods of detection, 
verification, and remediation will allow network defenders to keep up with those risks. 
This thesis examined whether automated cyber defenses promise to be more effective 
than current models to cope with the results of vulnerabilities introduced by the projected 
increase in internet-enabled devices. The thesis further proposed a future model called 
Automated Defense of Cyber Systems, built upon three core technological components: 
sensors, autonomics, and artificial intelligence. Our conclusion is that automation is the 
future of cyber defense, and that advances are being made in each of the three 
technological components to support needed productivity gains for information 
technology security personnel. Continued advances will occur piecemeal, and it is 
recommended that network defenders make incremental investments consistent with an 
automated defensive strategy.  
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This thesis examined if automated cyber defense promises to be more effective 
than current models to cope with the results of vulnerabilities introduced by the projected 
increase in internet-enabled devices. The question was scoped to foresee cyberspace 
landscape evolution over the next 10 to 15 years. In particular, the author claims the 
anticipated exponential growth of internet-of-Things (IoT) devices will open 
vulnerabilities at such a rate that current manual methods of detection, verification, and 
remediation will not be able to keep up. The thesis then explains why the automation of 
cyber defenses will be more effective than current models in performing methodical 
tasks, and that such automation will be required to handle the oncoming crush of IoT 
devices and associated vulnerabilities.   
Current defensive models and efforts are not adequate to defend networks from 
the volume of vulnerabilities introduced through IoT devices. Three gaps contribute to 
this: 1) the expected exponential growth of IoT devices, 2) limited growth of IT security 
personnel and budgets, and 3) an increase in cyber attacks, to include machine-to-
machine attacks. The mass proliferation of internet-enabled devices has the potential to 
unravel traditional mechanisms of coping with cyber attacks. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) has warned of threats associated with the spread of IoT devices, and 
the number of attacks are increasing. The compromise of vulnerable devices connected to 
the internet will foster malicious actor attempts to disrupt or gain access to all types of 
sensitive networks. Furthermore, the number of cybersecurity professionals will not grow 
at the same pace as the devices requiring protection. This will result in expanding gaps in 
cyber defenses.   
The IoT wave began in earnest in the early part of the current decade, and there is 
no reason to believe it will abate from exponential growth. Additionally, the internet has 
shown to be inherently insecure since inception, with new vulnerabilities introduced and 
identified on a regular basis. Terrorism, nation states, and organized crime will continue 
to be the primary malicious actors, and the level of associated threat may even grow as 
the cost to conduct offensive cyber operations drops while the cost to defend increases. 
 xiv 
Consequently, there will be a greater surface area with vulnerabilities exploitable by 
those motivated to attack. 
Defensive models have evolved since the inception of the internet, beginning with 
a simplistic exterior network defense, progressing to layered, ever-vigilant, and 
intelligence driven. Both industry and government have adapted to increasingly complex 
networks, setting frameworks for establishing defensive efforts, exchanging attack 
intelligence, and moving toward partial automation. However, broad use of external/
offensive cyber operations is not viable, particularly by private industry, as it has high 
business and professional risks, introduces the potential for criminal liability, and may 
lead to unintended escalation between nation states. 
Greater automation is viewed as the future of cyber defense. Numerous 
technological advantages are on the near-to-mid horizon to help perform many 
cybersecurity functions. They will take advantage of the same exponential growth curve 
as seen in the introduction of IoT devices, thereby allowing a slowly growing number of 
cybersecurity professionals to defend vastly larger and more complex networks. Three 
core technological components are identified as essential toward realizing what is 
proposed by the thesis as the automated defenses of cyber systems (ADCS): sensors, 
autonomic computing, and artificial intelligence (AI). Various technological 
advancements are cited as evidence of each component’s emergence. 
The realization of ADCS will not take place overnight. It is much more likely it 
will arrive piecemeal, with incremental improvements to the sensor, autonomic, and AI 
components. National policy should continue to encourage investment in the broad use of 
defensive cyber automation. Such automation should be limited to activities contained 
within a defender’s network, and should not include offensive cyber measures in which 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability triad is compromised without authorization. 
When considering incremental improvements from today’s cyber security environment, a 
logical first step is to provide the advantages of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Continuous Diagnosis and Mitigation program to private industry. Further, private 
industry’s use and contribution to cyber vulnerability and threat information sharing is 
critical; barriers to participation in the Automated Indicator Sharing program should be 
 xv 
aggressively removed, whether through incentives, regulatory control, or mitigation of 
civil liability. Finally, organizations should develop an investment strategy in building 
sensor networks that support business operations. This encompasses evaluation and 
iteration of data useful for collection. Likewise, they should invest in development and 
maturation of computational models that capture business functions. Rather than trying to 
model entire systems, such development should be incremental, focusing on the most 
critical business processes, data sets, or network segments. This, in turn, will feed into 
improvements in automation.   
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This thesis examines if automated cyber defense promises to be more effective 
than current models to cope with vulnerabilities introduced by the projected increase in 
internet-enabled devices. The question is scoped to foresee cyberspace landscape 
evolution over the next 10 to 15 years. In particular, the author claims the anticipated 
exponential growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices will open vulnerabilities at such a 
rate that current manual methods of detection, verification, and remediation will not be 
able to keep up. The thesis then explains why the automation of cyber defenses is more 
effective than current models in performing methodical tasks, and why such automation 
will be required to handle the oncoming crush of IoT devices and associated 
vulnerabilities. Anticipated technological developments critical to automation are 
examined, which organizations should be able to leverage to enhance their cybersecurity 
posture. 
Current defensive models and efforts are not adequate to defend networks from 
the volume of vulnerabilities introduced through IoT devices. Three gaps contribute to 
this: 1) the expected exponential growth of IoT devices, 2) limited growth of IT security 
personnel and budgets, and 3) an increase in cyber attacks, to include machine-to-
machine attacks. 
Three core technological components are identified as essential toward realizing 
the automated defenses of cyber systems (ADCS): sensors, autonomic computing, and 
artificial intelligence (AI). Various technological advancements are cited as evidence of 
each component’s emergence. The realization of ADCS will likely arrive piecemeal, with 
incremental improvements to the sensor, autonomic, and AI components. The purpose of 
this thesis is to inform policy on acceptance of the ADCS model, and to encourage 




Despite periodic embarrassing revelations of cyber attacks, today’s organizations 
do their best to internally manage cybersecurity risks through various mitigation 
strategies. Impacted consumers typically recognize their involvement only when they are 
notified, usually with an offer of free credit monitoring or a new credit card. However, 
this will change as consumers increasingly use IoT devices in almost every imaginable 
way. A glimpse of what is to come was recently shown when Fisher-Price acknowledged 
a vulnerability in one of its WiFi-connected smart toy bear lines that had the potential to 
expose children’s personally identifiable information (PII).1 
The mass proliferation of internet-enabled devices has the potential to unravel 
traditional cyber attack coping mechanisms. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has warned of threats associated with the spread of IoT devices, stating it “increases the 
target space for malicious actors.”2 Typical IoT devices are smartphones, closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras, connected cars, industrial sensors connected to the internet, 
and emerging smart devices such as smart watches and appliances. In the near-term 
future, IoT will encompass any product of any size that communicates through the 
internet. 
Left unchecked, risk managers in government and the private sector will struggle 
to secure burgeoning attack surfaces, and impacts from successful cyber attacks are likely 
to increase in frequency and severity. An attack surface of a software environment is “the 
sum of the different points (the ‘attack vectors’) where an unauthorized user (the 
‘attacker’) can try to enter data to or extract data from an environment.”3 
 
                                                 
1 “Researchers Discover a Not-So-Smart Flaw in Smart Toy Bear,” Trend Micro, February 4, 2016, 
http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/Internet-of-things/researchers-discover-flaw-in-smart-
toy-bear.  
2 Douglas Bonderud, “IoT Warning: FBI Says More Devices Equal Bigger Attack Surface,” Security 
Intelligence, last modified September 15, 2015, https://securityintelligence.com/news/iot-warning-fbi-says-
more-devices-equal-bigger-attack-surface/. 
3 Wikipedia, s.v. “Attack Surface,” last modified September 8, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface. 
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A recent example was revealed in June 2016 when the cybersecurity firm Securi 
reported a distributed denial of service attack targeting a small business. What made this 
attack relevant is that the underlying botnet4 was attributed to over 25,000 compromised 
internet-enabled CCTVs, devices that most consumers do not think of as networked 
computers. Furthermore, the devices were spread out globally and came from various 
CCTV vendors.5 This suggested the devices were compromised by a single exploit, 
possibly through a previously disclosed vulnerability in digital video recording software 
commonly used within CCTV devices to allow remote code execution.6 In lay terms, the 
bad guy—who may have been across the street or on another continent—executed 
programs on another person’s computer without the owner’s knowledge or consent. This 
was not only bad for the small business targeted by the botnet, but also for every one of 
the CCTV owners who gave a skilled hacker an entryway into their corporate, business, 
or home networks. 
Current cybersecurity models were developed in a pre-IoT internet era, most 
frequently characterized by a client/server environment in which desktop and laptop 
computers were clients, and rack-mounted hardware were servers. Unfortunately, these 
models are insufficient to address vulnerabilities associated with the impending 
expansion of cyber surface area through IoT. Furthermore, the number of cybersecurity 
professionals will not grow at the same rate as the devices requiring protection. This will 
result in expanding gaps in cyber defenses. The compromise of vulnerable devices 
connected to the internet will foster malicious actor attempts to disrupt or gain access to 
all types of sensitive networks. Consequences will magnify as governments, businesses, 
and individuals grow increasingly dependent on these networks. 
                                                 
4 From Wikipedia, “A botnet is a number of Internet-connected computers communicating with other 
similar machines in which components located on networked computers communicate and coordinate their 
actions by command and control (C&C) or by passing messages to one another (C&C might be built into 
the botnet as peer-to-peer).” Wikipedia, s.v. “Botnet,” last modified September 1, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet. 
5 Daniel Cid, “Large CCTV Botnet Leveraged in DDos Attacks,” sucuri, last modified June 27, 2016, 
https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/06/large-cctv-botnet-leveraged-ddos-attacks.html. 
6 Rotem Kerner, “Remote Code Execution in CCTV-DVR Affecting over 70 Different Vendors,” 
Kerner on Security, March 22, 2016, http://www.kerneronsec.com/2016/02/remote-code-execution-in-cctv-
dvrs-of.html. 
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While eliminating all cyber risk is not reasonable, a better choice over today’s 
cybersecurity models is needed that will allow cybersecurity professionals to manage 
vulnerabilities on more complex networks with exponentially more devices. This thesis 
proposes such a model. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The research is based upon a review of cybersecurity literature, which includes 
academic books, peer-reviewed articles, research papers, government publications, 
testimony before Congress, commercial literature, news articles, and online blogs 
conversant with the topic. As an exploratory effort, relevant points of information were 
extracted and presented to build a logical narrative describing the current and predictive 
future state of cyber attacks and available cybersecurity solutions. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II describes impending threats in terms of trends in internet-based 
technologies that will shape the future cyberspace landscape. The vulnerabilities come 
primarily from IoT and how quickly these devices will be deployed, trends in IT security 
personnel and budget investments, and the motivations of malicious actors. Changes 
around the cost structure and frequency of cyber attacks are also reviewed. 
Chapter III examines current cybersecurity models, starting with significant 
historical roots of the security challenges we face today and will face in the future. Four 
prominent cybersecurity models are presented: 1) network boundary control, 2) defense-
in-depth, 3) continuous monitoring, and 4) intelligence driven. Finally, four recent and 
critical cybersecurity initiatives, designed to address current threats are reviewed: 1) the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, 2) 
Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), 3) Continuous Diagnosis and Monitoring (CDM), 
and 4) Active Cyber Defense (ACD). 
Chapter IV proposes a change in cybersecurity approach called automated defense 
of cyber systems (ADCS). It represents two critical shifts in cyber defense: a move away 
from current client/server conceptual models to a much more complex, organic 
 5 
perspective of networked systems; and an evolution from manual, human-driven 
interventions to automation. Three core technological components are critical toward 
realizing this evolution, which are 1) mass promulgation of internet-enabled sensors, 2) 
autonomic computing, and 3) artificial intelligence techniques. 
Chapter V provides findings, conclusions, and recommendations, which are 
geared to both cybersecurity professionals and policy makers, and designed to accelerate 
adoption of ADCS. The chapter also suggests several areas of future research for those 
wishing to continue examining this topic.  
 6 
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II. FUTURE LANDSCAPE OF CYBERSECURITY 
This chapter describes the most likely near-future threats due to the IoT, 
investment trends for IT security personnel and budgets, and the motivations of three 
groups of malicious actors. Changes around the cost structure of vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and defenses are also reviewed. 
A. INTERNET OF THINGS IMPACT ON CYBERSPACE 
The IoT is defined as “interrelated computing devices, mechanical and digital 
machines, objects, [etc.] with unique identifiers and the ability to transfer data over a 
network without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction.”7 Such 
devices include not just smartphones and tablets, but wearable health monitors, 
televisions that stream videos, and sensors that read voltage on power lines, to name only 
a few. 
In 2015, nearly two-thirds of American adults had a smartphone, 90 percent had 
broadband service at home, and only 7 percent had neither a smartphone nor broadband 
service at home.8 In January 2015, there were over 50 million publically available WiFi 
hotspots globally, and the number is projected to reach 340 million by 2018.9 With this 
infrastructure in place, an overwhelming majority of Americans have ready access to 
highly functional devices connected to the internet, which will act as gateways to take 
advantage of IoT devices and capabilities. Citizens will be able to access their IoT 
devices from virtually anywhere. We will increasingly work, learn, socialize, pay our 
bills, lock our doors, monitor our heart rate, watch our children or favorite zoo animals, 
and check the contents of our refrigerator, all from anywhere with a signal. 
                                                 
7 Margaret Rouse, “Internet of Things (IoT),” Whatis.com, accessed August 28, 2016, 
http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/Internet-of-Things-IoT. 
8 Aaron Smith, “U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015,” Pew Research Center, April 1, 2015, 2–3, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.  




1. Exponential Growth 
Within the next decade, IoT devices will dominate the cyber landscape. In a 
research brief published in September 2015, CompTIA projected compound growth of 
23.1 percent annually, with over 50.1 million devices by 2020.10 Using CompTIA’s 
historic and projected data points, a calculation of growth can be expressed by the 
following formula: 
Number of Devices in Billions = 0.121 * 1.231^(Year – 1991). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, this calculates out to an astounding 400+ billion devices 
by 2030. While the value of the coefficient in this formula is up for debate, such 
projections are entirely plausible given potential reduction in cost, size, and power 
requirements for each IoT device, along with increases in business application and 
efficiencies as commercial IoT solutions emerge. The critical concept is that deployment 
is on an exponential growth curve, and that we are only at the beginning of that curve. 
 
Figure 1.  Projected Number of IoT Devices 
 
                                                 
10 CompTIA, “Sizing up the Internet of Things,” August 28, 2015, 4, 
https://www.comptia.org/resources/sizing-up-the-internet-of-things.  
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Improvement—and subsequent adoption—of a new technology is frequently 
described in terms of an S-curve. Harvard business professor Clayton Christensen 
explains an S-curve as slow progress in early stages, increasing as the technology 
becomes better understood and slowing as it approaches a natural or physical limit.11 
Figure 1 only shows the beginning of the S-curve, and it is reasonable to question when 
IoT market saturation will occur. However, market saturation is unlikely to occur for IoT 
device integration, at least during the projected period; advances in computational 
capacity and miniaturization will propel new and innovative uses of IoT devices. 
According to Professor Jianguo Ding, University of Skövde, “Computing is deeply 
embedded into every physical component, possibly even into materials.”12 Unlike 
traditional markets, where physical limits are often associated with the number of people 
(e.g., the percentage of device ownership approaches 100 percent), there does not appear 
to be a limit of IoT devices per person. As is later argued in Chapter IV, traditional 
networks of servers and wires will almost completely cease to exist, replaced by mobile 
nanodevices, which are tiny computers measured in nanometers with integrated wireless 
connectivity. Therefore, maturation in the IoT S-curve cannot be reasonably projected 
until a better understanding of the natural and physical limits are understood. 
2. IoT Impact on Cybersecurity 
The IoT is vastly expanding the attack surface vulnerable to malicious 
exploitation. To more precisely specify what is included within the IoT attack surface, the 
not-for-profit Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) drafted a mapping of 19 
distinct  IoT attack surface area categories to 130 vulnerability types, and then published 
the list of top ten vulnerabilities (see Figure 2). These findings were more recently 
supported by Hewlett Packard Enterprise in 2015. Hewlett Packard’s study of common 
household IoT devices found that 80 percent used weak passwords (susceptible to brute 
force password attacks), 70 percent used unencrypted services (susceptible to network 
                                                 
11 Clayton M. Christensen, “Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-curve. Part I: Component 
Technologies,” Production and Operations Management 1, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 334. 
12 Jianguo Ding, “Intrusion Detection, Prevention, and Response System (IDPRS) for Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPSs),” in Securing Cyber-Physical Systems, ed. Al-Sakib Khan Pathan (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2015), 373. 
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sniffing), 70% allowed account enumeration (allows refined attack targeting), and 60% 
exhibited user interface vulnerabilities (persistent cross-site scripting and weak 
credentials).13 To demonstrate growth in potential exploitation of these vulnerabilities, a 
2016 AT&T Security Operations Center report noted a 458 percent increase in IoT 
vulnerability scans over the past two years.14 
 
Figure 2.  OWASP Top10 IoT Vulnerabilities in 201415 
Even skeptics among cybersecurity professionals acknowledge the eventual 
emergence of risk associated with the IoT. Andrzej Kawalec, head of security research 
and chief technology officer at Hewlett Packer Security Services, stated, “Although there 
may be an immediate threat to business due to some consumer IoT device that’s been 
                                                 
13 “Internet of Things Research Study,” Hewlett Packard Enterprise, November 2015, 4, 
https://www.hpe.com/h20195/V2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA5-4759ENW.pdf.  
14 “The CEO’s Guide to Security the Internet of Things,” AT&T, 2016, 8, 
https://www.business.att.com/cybersecurity/docs/exploringiotsecurity.pdf.  
15 Source: Sebastien Gioria, “CLUSIRInfoNord OWASP IoT 2014,” LinkedIn, January 20, 2015, 
http://www.slideshare.net/SebastienGioria/clusir-infonord-owasp-iot-2014. 
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adopted, most businesses will only face this in around five years’ time.”16 Despite 
downplaying current risk, his full statement made clear that specific early-adopter 
industries (e.g., healthcare, hotels) are currently vulnerable, and that it is only a matter of 
time before competitive advantage forces industries to adopt IoT devices. Kawalec 
described this moment as the “IoT tsunami.” 
B. IT SECURITY PERSONNEL AND BUDGETS 
1. IT Security Personnel 
While the number of managed devices grows exponentially, the number of 
personnel responsible for securing those devices will not. According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), the job growth outlook for information security analysts is 18 
percent between 2014 and 2024, starting in 2014 at 82,900 positions.17 BLS projects an 
8-percent growth rate for network and computer systems administrators—a position that 
overlaps significantly with information security analysts—over the same period, starting 
with 382,600 positions. Combined, they project an average growth rate of 9.8 percent, 
with a 2014 base of 465,500 positions.18 
While the combined growth figure for these two positions is higher than the BLS 
average job growth outlook of 7 percent, it is negligible compared to the projected 800 
percent growth of IoT devices during the same timeframe. If position productivity were 
measured by an employee’s ability to manage a set number of devices, and presuming the 
U.S. growth of IoT devices mirrors the global projection provided in Section A1, the 
2024 employee would have to manage 730 percent more devices than his or her 2014 
counterpart. 
                                                 
16 Warwick Ashford, “Exploding IoT attack surface Not an Immediate Threat to Business,” 
ComputerWeekly, May 27, 2016, http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450297327/Exploding-IoT-
attack-surface-not-an-immediate-threat-to-business. 
17 “Occupational Outlook Handbook: Information Security Analyst,” Department of Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, December 17, 2015, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-
technology/information-security-analysts.htm. 
18 “Occupational Outlook Handbook: Network and Computer Systems Administrators,” Department 
of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 17, 2015, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-
information-technology/network-and-computer-systems-administrators.htm. 
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2. IT Security Budgets 
The investment in IT security budgets, which is anticipated to grow, also pales in 
comparison to the 23.1 percent compound growth of IoT devices. Gartner, Inc. assessed 
global IT spending at $75.4 billion in 2015, and projects the market will grow at 
compound annual growth rate of 7.8 percent through 2019, which equates to annual 
spending north of $100 billion at that time.19 Overall IT spending is expected to grow 
only 1.9 percent. 
As Mark Lobel of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) put it, “Strategic security 
spending demands that businesses … fund processes that fully integrate predictive, 
preventive, detective, and incidence response capabilities.”20 However, given the 
anticipated personnel increase, a significant portion of the IT spending growth can 
reasonably be expected to pay for salaries, to include salary growth from inflation. Only a 
portion of those funds, whether funded through IT security budgets or general IT budgets, 
will be available for investment in employee productivity. 
C. MALICIOUS ACTORS 
This section assesses if categories of cyber actors unacceptably disrupting social 
order today will continue to do so in the future. Understanding motivations, and how they 
may evolve, is an important component in understanding the threat environment within 
which a defender exists. The FBI has identified three broad groups that constitute cyber 
threats today: terrorists, state-sponsored actors, and criminal organizations.21 Given 
history and human nature, it is fair to assume these threats will persist. 
                                                 
19 “Gartner says Worldwide Information Security Spending Will Grow Almost 4.7 Percent to Reach 
75.4 Billion in 2015,” Gartner, September 23, 2015, http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3135617; 
“Forecast Analysis: Information Security, Wordwide, 4Q15 Update,” Gartner, March 22, 2016, 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/3261517/forecast-analysis-information-security-worldwide. 
20 “Security Incidents Continue to Rise in Cost and Frequency while Budgets Decrease, According to 
PwC, CIO and SCO’s The Global State of Information Security Survey 2015,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
September 30, 2014, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/global-state-of-information-security-
survey-2015.html. 
21 Shawn Henry, “Cyber Threat: On the Front Lines with Shawn Henry,” Federal Bureau of 




Terrorism, in the traditional sense of the term, is defined within the United States 
by 18 U.S.C. § 2331. While the statute differentiates between domestic and international 
terrorism, both comprise a violent or dangerous act that violates U.S. law with the intent 
“(a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” The difference between domestic and 
international terrorism is, as the words imply, whether the perpetrator’s desired effect 
occurs primarily inside or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.22 The 
term “cyber terrorism,” in comparison, does not have a formal legal definition. It often 
conflates issues such as unauthorized hacking, propaganda dissemination, and 
recruitment.23 To limit scope, Jian Hua and Sanjay Bapna proposed that cyber terrorism 
is an act performed by individuals who seek to deny the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of networked computing technologies, to include data, from authorized users, 
for the purpose of either interfering with significant political, social, or economic 
functioning, or to induce physical violence or panic.24  
Terrorist organizations are increasingly using cyber terrorism, as Hua and Bapna 
defined it, to meet their objectives. While analyzing news media coverage of cyber 
terrorism matters, researchers identified an increase in related articles, calculating an 
average of 2.2 items per month for the 33 months prior to 2010, and 5.4 per month in the 
following 32 months—an increase of 236 percent.25 In explaining cyberterrorism’s 
strategic advantages for potential attackers, John Klein of Falcon Research cited very low 
start-up costs, enhanced anonymity over kinetic methods, a wide swath of potential 
                                                 
22 Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
23 E. E. Nesmeyanov, A. M. Rudenko, and V. V. Kotlyarova, “Sociocultural Analysis of 
Cyberterrorism in Social Nets within the Problems of Information Safety of Russian Society,” Science 
Almanaca Black Sea Countries 4 (2015): 3. 
24 Jian Hua and Sanjay Bapna, “The Economic Impact of Cyber Terrorism,” The Journal of Strategic 
Information Systems 22, no. 2 (2013): 3. 
25 Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald, and Andrew Whiting, “Constructing Cyberterrorism as a Security 
Threat: A Study of International News Media Coverage,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 1 (2015). 
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targets, and the ability to conduct attacks remotely.26 Examples of cyber attacks include: 
a) intimidating a target, often through denial-of-service attacks in which ongoing business 
operations supported through networked technology are disrupted; b) delivering 
propaganda by co-opting and defacing networked information delivery mechanisms; and 
c) obtaining and releasing information to facilitate kinetic targeting of specific locations 
or individuals. 
Future terrorists will see cyberterrorism as a quick and cost-effective means to 
move their agendas forward. Additionally, as technology becomes further integrated and 
available worldwide, potential cyber terrorists will have both an entry point from which 
to conduct a cyber attack and a better understanding of society’s reliance on internet-
based technologies. 
2. Nation States 
When providing the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community” to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the director of national 
intelligence led with cyber and technology threats from other nation states.27 When 
considering cyber attackers, the term “state-sponsored” refers to the disruption or 
obtainment of unauthorized access to networked systems by countries, or their proxies, to 
achieve a national objective. Nations have broad ranges of military, political, and 
economic interests, and state-sponsored hacking is inclusive of both cyberwarfare—
characterized by attacks intended to damage or deny advantage at the strategic, tactical, 
and operational levels—and cyber espionage—characterized by clandestine intelligence 
collection and covert operations conducted predominantly online.28 Given the availability 
of networked systems impacting those interests, the number of potential targets is limited 
                                                 
26 John J. Klein, “Deterring and Dissuading Cyberterrorism,” Journal of Strategic Security 8, no. 4 
(2015): 27–28. 
27 Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (2016) (“Statement for the Record: 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” James R. Clapper), 2–4, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf. 
28 Maren Leed, Offensive Cyber Capabilities at the Operational Level, (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic International Studies, 2013), 2, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130916_Leed_OffensiveCyberCapabilities_Web.pdf.  
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by only two factors: 1) a nation’s laws and policies on acceptable norms of behavior in 
cyberspace, and 2) resources available to pursue targets. 
While sensitive techniques associated with military action are often classified, 
instances of alleged cyberwarfare have been documented, likely due to their directly 
observable impacts. One of the earliest examples involved the targeting of U.S. 
computers by the Yugoslav air defense system during the 1998 conflict.29 In another 
example, cyber attackers were alleged to be directed, or intentionally incited, by the 
Russian government in response to a 2007 political incident; these cyber attacks 
effectively disrupted internet-based services in Estonia, thereby contributing to regional 
chaos in a manner that Russia could exploit.30 Similarly, Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps–led Iranian hackers allegedly conducted a series of denial-of-service attacks in 
2012 against a large number of U.S. financial sector institutions,31 presumably “in 
response to increasingly strong economic sanctions imposed by the United States and 
Europe in an attempt to force Iran to curtail its nuclear program.”32 
State-sponsored cyber espionage, by nature, is hidden by perpetrators via state 
secrets. Unlike cyberwarfare, well-executed cyber espionage attacks are not directly 
observable, and concrete examples are hard to find. The range of cyber espionage 
activities include recruiting human intelligence, spying on dissident expatriate 
communities, gaining economic advantage or foreign influence, and obtaining foreign 
government information. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) global targeting of 
proprietary and commercial information, for example, is well documented in reports by 
various governments, and has fueled a massive expansion of private cybersecurity firms. 
These firms have produced detailed technical reports that suggest the PRC is transitioning 
                                                 
29 Bradley Graham, “Military Grappling with Rules for Cyber Warfare,” Washington Post, November 
8, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com.  
30 Jason Richards “Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and its Implications for U.S. National 
Security,” International Affairs Review 18, no. 2 (2009). 
31 “International Cyber Crime: Iranians Charged with Hacking U.S. Financial Sector,” Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, March 24, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/iranians-charged-with-hacking-us-
financial-sector. 
32 Ellen Nakashima and Matt Zapotosky, “U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers with Targeting Banks, 
N.Y, Dam,” Washington Post, March 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com.  
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from seeking volume to pursuing focused cyber attack targeting.33 In its 2015 Global 
Threat Report, Crowdstrike opined the PRC’s massive targeting of PII across various 
public and private databases could enable identification of individuals with access and 
potentially susceptible to recruitment.34 Additionally, the Russian government is 
suspected of leaking Democratic National Committee emails to WikiLeaks during the 
2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, possibly to create domestic turmoil and to move the 
United States to a less-engaged position globally.35 
These examples show that valuable targets are available to sovereign entities, with 
promise for relatively quick and inexpensive national gain when compared to diplomacy, 
public policy, or judicial processes. Considering the expanded network surface via the 
IoT, nation states will have exponentially greater avenues through which to exploit 
targets. Senior Defense Analyst Brian Mazanec captured it best when he wrote, “The 
norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons predicts grim prospects for the 
evolution of constraining cyber norms.”36 
3. Organized Crime 
Organized crime, and its corresponding definition, has changed as a result of law 
enforcement’s targeted disruption efforts. Forty years ago, organized crime was 
predominantly seen as monolithic, often limited by ethnicity and motivated by greed and 
territorial power. A contemporary view of organized crime is far more inclusive of 
loosely coupled networks of groups and individuals with varying motivations. These can 
include traditional criminal goals of monetary gain, but also “intellectual challenge, 
individual or group notoriety, lust …, ideology, rebellion, and curiosity.”37 Such groups 
                                                 
33 “Redline Drawn: China Recalculates its Use of Cyber Espionage,” FireEye, accessed August 21, 
2016, 15, https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-espionage.pdf. 
34 “2015 Crowdstrike Global Threat Report,” Crowdstrike, accessed August 21, 2016, 6, 
https://www.crowdstrike.com/global-threat-report-2015/. 
35 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.,” 
New York Times, July 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com. 
36 Brian M. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 9, no. 2 (2015): 95. 
37 Roderic Broadhurst et al., “Organizations and Cyber Crime: An Analysis of the Nature of Groups 
Engaged in Cyber Crime,” International Journal of Cyber Criminology 8, no. 1 (2014): 3. 
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lend themselves well to the internet’s distributed and often anonymous nature. In 
characterizing the transition from offline to online groups conducting cybercrime, 
criminologist Dr. Michael McGuire modeled six types of group structures: swarm, hub, 
clustered hybrid, extended hybrid, hierarchy, and aggregate groups.38 The first two 
operate predominantly online, the third and fourth mix online and offline activity, and the 
fifth and sixth are predominantly offline. The online elements of the first four groups are 
often fluid, requiring technical and expert ebb and flow to meet a specific criminal 
goal.39 
In addition to adapting their structure, criminals adapt their techniques to evade 
law enforcement. Using open source and commercially available tools allow criminals to 
obscure both the origin and contents of internet communication. The evolution of 
ransomware between Cryptolocker and CryptoWall demonstrated the integration of the 
Onion Router (to obfuscate network traffic patterns) and virtual currency payment (to 
avoid financial transaction reporting).40 Another such adaptation is criminal use of 
encryption and ephemeral services to hinder law enforcement’s ability to search or 
intercept communications, which has been outlined by the FBI in a phenomenon called 
“Going Dark.”41 
D. INCENTIVES AND FREQUENCY OF CYBER ATTACKS  
An examination of attacker and defender incentives shows resource costs 
decreasing for attackers, while increasing for defenders. This will likely elevate cyber 
attacks, as actors frequently possess both the resources and intent to conduct an attack. 
Furthermore, the frequency of attacks is increasing. 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Broadhurst et al., “Organizations and Cyber Crime,” 3. 
40 Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (December 9, 2015) (testimony of James B. 
Comey before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-
the-federal-bureau-of-investigation-8. 
41 “Going Dark,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed July 29, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational-technology/going-dark. 
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1. Cost to Attack 
The cost to build and use cyber tools to exploit cyber vulnerabilities is low and 
decreasing. Hacking toolkits are frequently updated and readily available. Many are free, 
openly developed, and co-opted from legitimate network security uses (e.g., nmap, cain 
& able, and Nikto).42 The price of a remote access Trojan went from between $50 and 
$250 in 2013 to between $5 and $10 in 2016.43 Distributed denial-of-service attacks were 
sold for $50 per night.44 Particularly disturbing research from Dell SecureWorks in 2016 
showed that some of these markets have been allowed to mature in relative stability, to a 
point where they have incorporated higher-functioning business processes built around 
customer service and guarantees of value.45 
The cost to obtain criminal means that enable cyber attacks is also decreasing, 
evident in analysis of virtual black markets between 2005 and 2011. The analysis 
indicated that standard U.S. credit cards were sold for $6 and skimmers, used to steal 
credit card data, ranged from $425 to $6,000.46 Dell Secureworks further showed that 
virtual marketplaces are flooded with counterfeit documents, and that the breadth and 
depth of stolen financial information has expanded. Between 2014 and 2016, the cost of a 
matching social security card, driver’s license, and utility bill dropped from $350 to 
$90.47  
Beyond criminal use, the cost of state-sponsored advanced malware has dropped 
precipitously. Costin Raiu, head of global research and analysis at Kaspersky Lab, stated 
during a prepared speech that Stuxnet, an early cyber weapon that targeted Iran’s nuclear 
                                                 
42 “Hacker Tools Top Ten: Our Recommended Tools for 2016,” Concise AC, accessed August 26, 
2016, https://www.concise-courses.com/hacking-tools/top-ten/. 
43 Ibid., 4. 
44 Ziming Zhao et al., “Mules, Seals, and Attacking Tools: Analyzing 12 Online Marketplaces,” IEEE 
Security & Privacy 14, no. 3 (2016): 37. 
45 “Underground Hacker Markets,” Dell SecureWorks, 2016, 7, 
https://www.secureworks.com/resources/rp-2016-underground-hacker-marketplace-report.  
46 Zhao et al. “Mules, Seals, and Attacking Tools,” 37. 
47 “Underground Hacker Markets,” Dell SecureWorks, 5, 14. 
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development program, was estimated to cost $100 million.48 The IceFog malware, which 
targeted U.S. energy companies, was hypothesized to cost $10,000. Raiu went on to 
opine, “The cost of entry for [advanced persistent threats] is decreasing …. We’re going 
to see more surgical strikes and critical infrastructure attacks.”49 
2. Cost of an Attack 
The cost borne by cyber attack victims is increasing. A 2014 report by Intel 
Security (McAfee) estimated the damage caused by cybercrime to be more than 
$400 billion annually.50 Analysis conducted by Juniper Research projects cyber data 
breaches will globally cost society $2.1 trillion by 2019—a fourfold increase over their 
estimated breach costs for 2015, compounding at an astonishing annual rate of 41 
percent.51 HP Enterprise Security underwrote a 2015 survey of 252 large organizations 
(1000+ individuals) on the global cost caused by cybercrime, cataloging 1,928 total 
attacks, and found that the mean cost associated with an incident was $7.7 million.52 The 
study has been repeated annually with incident costs on the rise, albeit at an annual rate 
of 1.9 percent. Of the external costs incurred, the top three impacted areas were business 
disruption (39 percent), information loss (35 percent), and revenue loss (21 percent).53 
3. Attack Frequency 
In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, FBI Assistant Director 
Joseph Demarest stated, “The frequency and impact of cyber attacks on our nation’s 
private sector and government networks have increased dramatically in the past decade 
                                                 
48 Pierluigi Paganini, “Speaking at Kaspersky Lab’s Industry Analyst Summit Costin Raiu, Revealed 
that the Cost for APT Campaign is Dramatically Dropping,” Security Affairs, February 9, 2014, 
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/22056/cyber-crime/apt-cost-dramatically-dropping.html. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Intel Security, Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime (Santa Clara, CA: Intel 
Security Center for Strategic and International Studies 2014), 2. 
51 “Cybercrime Will Cost Businesses Over $2 Trillion by 2019,” Juniper Research, May 12, 2015, 
http://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion. 
52 Ponemon Institute, 2015 Global Report on the Cost of Cyber Crime (Traverse City, ME: Ponemon 
Institute, 2015), 6. 
53 Ibid., 16. 
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and are expected to continue to grow.”54 A PwC survey showed 42.8 million security 
incidents in 2015, with the data indicating that the compound annual growth rate of 
detected security incidents “has increased 66 percent year over year since 2009.”55 
The number of cybersecurity incidents continues to rise. During testimony for the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office Director Gregory C. 
Wilshusen presented a chart demonstrating growth in cyber incidents reported by federal 
agencies to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, growing from 5,503 in 2006 
to 67,168 in 2014.56 The data suggest a linear growth rate (see Figure 3), which projects 
over 150,000 reported incidents on federal systems by 2025. 
                                                 
54 Joseph Demarest, “Statement of Joseph Demarest Assistant Director Cyber Division Federal Bureau 
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21, 2014, 2. 
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Actual incidents were adapted from data in Wilshusen, “Information Security.” Forecast incidents were projected consistent with actual incident data. 
Figure 3.  Projecting Federal Cyber Incidents Reported to US-CERT 
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Machine-to-machine attacks may push the number of cyber attacks to a growth 
curve similar to the integration of IoT devices. Cybersecurity experts have predicted 2016 
will see the first generation of worms and viruses targeting “headless devices,” which are 
IoT devices without user interfaces that are controlled by hub devices, such as a 
smartphone.57 
In their examination of botnet designed to send spam email, Proofpoint observed 
that “25 percent of the volume was sent by … everyday consumer gadgets such as 
compromised home networking routers, connected multi-media centers, televisions and at 
least one refrigerator.”58 Two viable vectors of malicious code introduction include 
through the hub device (e.g., a smartphone downloads a compromised app) and supply 
chain (i.e., a new product ships with embedded malicious software).   
To summarize, the incentives for attackers are increasing, the impact to victims is 
increasing, and the frequency of attacks is increasing. While a causal relationship 
between the three is not explicitly drawn, the correlation is apparent. Attack costs and 
frequency remain valid metrics through which to evaluate the efficacy of future 
cybersecurity efforts. 
  
                                                 
57 Harriet Taylor, “Biggest Cybersecurity Threats in 2016,” CNBC, December 28, 2015, 
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III. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY EFFORTS 
A. A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE INTERNET 
1. Origins of Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity efforts are rooted in three core principles toward protecting data 
processed by networked computers: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In brief, 
confidentiality preserves privacy for and between authorized users of data, integrity 
ensures the data being processed has not been maliciously or unintentionally altered, and 
availability means users are able to access and use the data when they want to. These 
principles are collectively referred to as the “CIA triad,” and are the bedrock upon which 
the security of devices and systems are evaluated.59 They are applied to data at rest 
(saved to a hard drive or memory card), in process (being actively manipulated by a 
computing device), and in motion (being transmitted between devices over a network 
segment). Any malicious attempt to compromise the CIA triad is a cyber attack, whether 
successful or not. 
An additional cybersecurity concept can be considered as part of the “I” within 
the CIA triad: non-repudiation, defined as “proof of the integrity and origin of data that 
can be verified by a third party.”60 Non-repudiation is frequently associated with 
accountability of digital actions with a specific user, such as through a digital signature. 
Since 1988, progress toward achieving non-repudiation over the internet has been 
supported through the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which comprises a set of 
cryptographic standards implemented in a number of protocols, such as secure web 
browsing and the exchange of encrypted email.61 PKI is often associated with 
authentication—which confirms and ensures a computer user’s identity—and 
                                                 
59 Terry Chia, “Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability: The Three Components of the CIA Triad,” IT 
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authorization—which bounds access levels and actions available to a user of a 
computer system.62 
2. Inherent Insecurity 
The internet is inherently insecure, and the cause of the problem can be tracked 
down to three issues. First, the internet’s creators failed to fully contemplate security. 
Vinton Cerf, one of the original designers of the internet, admitted, “We didn’t focus on 
how you could wreck this system intentionally.”63 To the internet’s architects, the 
dominating security principle was survivability in the event of military action, not the 
CIA triad. The technologies to build in security were not available or sufficiently mature, 
in part due to limits in computational power available at the time and export controls on 
enabling technologies (i.e., encryption).64 As the designers defined the seven layers of 
the TCP/IP network stack, the primary objective was reliability. Initial engineering 
efforts were focused on getting the technology working, not the assurance of the CIA 
triad. This is why it is often said security was “bolted on” to the internet after the fact. 
Second, vulnerabilities are routinely introduced into every layer of the cyber 
ecosystem, and can never be entirely eliminated. Software bugs are defects in how a 
program was designed to operate, resulting in software behaviors that were not 
anticipated by the designer, and hackers seek to exploit bugs to actively circumvent how 
a program was designed to operate. In a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-
funded analysis, Coverity, Inc. found an error rate of 0.434 defects per thousand lines of 
code in a broad range of open-source software projects.65 Each of the TCP/IP layers 
requires programming, whether implemented in software or hardware. Bugs are fixed 
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over time, whether before or after programs are released.66 However, it is unlikely that 
programmers will be able to radically reduce future introduction of bugs in new 
programming efforts. Two factors drive this: the pace of competition to produce and sell 
new features, and rapid advancement of underlying hardware upon which programs run. 
The third fundamental internet security issue is that cyber attacks are a cat-and-
mouse game—they are perpetrated and defended by humans, acting and counteracting 
each other so that one can gain an advantage over the other. Those involved are 
characterized as “black hats,” “white hats,” and “gray hats.” Black hats work to 
compromise the CIA triad with malicious intent, while white hats work to ensure the CIA 
triad, particularly for devices they are charged to protect. Gray hats refer to those who 
actively work to compromise the CIA triad, perhaps to include conducting activities that 
have been criminalized, but without malicious intent.67 Ultimately, the human adversarial 
dynamic makes it difficult to predict the manifestation of future exploits, which makes it 
more difficult to defend against them. 
B. DEFENSIVE MODELS 
Network defenders have designed various models, tools, and techniques to help 
mitigate a hostile environment in which vulnerabilities are exploited by cyber threats 
actors. The most prevalent models are presented in this section. These models are not 
mutually exclusive, and are often used in combination. No model can fully protect a 
network. The goal of the defender is to reduce risk to an acceptable level at an acceptable 
cost. 
1. Network Boundary Control 
The network boundary control model is built upon the assumption that a cyber 
attack will originate from outside the defended network. Therefore, the simplest 
mechanism to protect the network would be one that enforces a secure border separating 
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the internal network from the external internet. In this model, devices with external 
network connections are identified, and robust security controls are placed on them. This 
puts the cybersecurity focus on any and all devices reachable from the internet. The 
model does not, however, defend devices and services within the network that are not 
directly accessible from the internet. Such an approach has been described as being like 
M&M candies, hard on the outside and soft on the inside.68   
Cybersecurity professionals have largely discounted this approach as a standalone 
model. A major flaw of this approach is the basic assumption that threats originate from 
outside an organization. The model is particularly vulnerable to insider threats—those 
who have authorized access to the defended network but exceed their scope of 
permissions for an unauthorized purpose. Once a malicious actor breaches the external 
defenses, the interior network is left unguarded and vulnerable. Another challenge to this 
model is that modern devices frequently combine plug-and-play configuration with 
multiple network interfaces, potentially opening holes in the wall unbeknownst to 
defenders. Despite these flaws, the network boundary control model remains commonly 
used as a building block within network security architectures to reduce the network 
surface area directly accessible from the internet. 
2. Defense-in-Depth 
Defense-in-depth was promulgated to overcome the single point of failure of the 
network boundary control model, and was conceptualized using the military principle of 
weakening an adversary by delaying an attacker’s advance through the ceding of 
defended territory. The cyber correlation is to deploy multiple forms of layered defenses, 
each requiring time and effort for an adversary to defeat, and to give defenders more time 
to recognize and then mitigate an attack. It provides for information assurance by making 
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cost-effective security investments focused on people (users), the technology of the 
system, and the system’s operation.69 
This approach raises the cybersecurity bar by acknowledging malicious events 
could originate from anywhere, even inside the organization. It also introduced a strategy 
toward managing security solutions over time, and is considered a best practice by many 
security professionals.70 However, the approach has been criticized because historic 
military advantages from defense-in-depth have not been realized within cyberspace. 
Specifically, attackers have not been weakened; rather, they are attacking and succeeding 
at higher rates, and delays from defensive layering have not significantly increased the 
amount of effort necessary for an attack to succeed.71 
3. Continuous Monitoring 
The continuous monitoring model assumes a network will not remain in a healthy 
state and it is therefore necessary to continuously review for faults. It further assumes 
devices and programs are designed to provide robust diagnostic information that can be 
logged and analyzed. Investment is focused on collecting and analyzing information from 
critical systems and network segments, identifying concerns, and alerting for further 
review and potential remediation. 
A monitoring and logging guide authored by CREST, a U.K.-based non-profit 
cybersecurity organization, outlined a framework and process toward implementing 
continuous monitoring. Figure 4 illustrates the framework in which common logging 
mechanisms within a network are analyzed.72 Such logs exist at the server, network, 
application, and security suite level. The seven-step process is to: 1) develop a 
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monitoring and logging plan; 2) identify and address your cybersecurity posture outside 
of logging and monitoring; 3) identify sources of security indicators; 4) develop people, 
processes, and practices to monitor and log; 5) buy or build monitoring and logging 
solutions; 6) integrate solutions into security architecture; and 7) maintain the 
capability.73 
 
Figure 4.  CREST Monitoring and Logging Framework74 
The main drawback of continuous monitoring is managing the complexity of 
information collected, and the level of effort required to synthesize the collected data into 
digestible information. The model also assumes devices and applications will generate 
sufficient logs to identify a fault. Finally, the model does not make explicit the 
remediation of incidents. 
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4. Intelligence-Driven 
The intelligence-driven model attempts to understand cyber attacks using 
information about the aggressor. Motivation and attack life cycle are analyzed to assess 
points of vulnerability and defensive gaps. Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain 
framework implements this at the operational level. It consists of seven stages through 
which an attacker must successfully progress, with the belief that a defender can disrupt 
the attacker at any of the seven stages.75 Adversary intelligence is collected and evaluated 
for each step toward identifying attack mitigation strategies. The seven stages of the 
Cyber Kill Chain are: 
• Reconnaissance—the attacker identifies the victim’s assets and potential 
vulnerabilities to exploit; 
• Weaponization—the attacker develops tools and scripts to conduct the 
cyber attack; 
• Delivery—the attacker deploys the tools and scripts previously developed, 
most likely remotely, toward the target; 
• Exploitation—the attacker uses the tools and scripts to take advantage of a 
vulnerability in the attacked system; 
• Installation—once unauthorized access is obtained, the attacker moves 
additional tools and scripts to the victim system(s) to further exploit the 
compromised network; 
• Command and Control (C2)—the attacker remotely controls the tools and 
scripts, allowing him or her to further exploit the compromised network; 
• Actions on Objectives—whether through exfiltration or destruction, the 
attacker affects his or her original goal for attacking the victim.76 
Deloitte introduced a more strategic model, geared toward processing of data and 
information into actionable intelligence (see Figure 5). Key elements include the 
collection of diversified information feeds from within and outside the defending 
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organization, integrated with expert analysis in a relevant contextual framework, and 
used to inform both technical and business decision processes. 
 
Figure 5.  Deloitte Cyber Intelligence Model77 
Despite its popularity, the Cyber Kill Chain has been criticized for focusing on 
malware and neglecting insider threat, social engineering, and non-malware remote 
access methods as the vector of intrusion.78 Another critique of Deloitte’s model is that it 
relies upon considerable analytical resources for intelligence production, almost certainly 
far greater than available to most organizations. 
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C. KEY CYBERSECURITY EFFORTS 
There has been considerable effort by the public and private sectors to address 
cybersecurity risks in today’s environment. This section highlights four of the most 
influential efforts underway, designed to familiarize network defenders with the current 
threat environment. Most aspects of these are human driven, as they rely upon the 
synthesis of complex information toward subjective judgements. 
1. NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
In 2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a branch of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, published Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, more popularly known as the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework. The purpose of the framework is to understand, manage, and reduce 
cybersecurity risks by prioritizing activities to assure critical operations and service 
delivery.79 It creates a common language to be used by cybersecurity professionals and 
executives that helps facilitate clearer communication when planning, implementing, and 
operating cybersecurity systems. The framework identifies four tiers of cybersecurity 
readiness with five core functions for effective cybersecurity (see Figure 6).80 Together, 
these tiers and functions allow organizations to evaluate their readiness posture and to 
prioritize where investments can most optimally be made. NIST recommends 
organizations progress to at least tier three (“Repeatable”) in their cybersecurity 
readiness. 
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NIST Cybersecurity Framework Tiers 
Tier Characteristics 
Partial 
• Ad hoc reactive risk management 
• Limited awareness of enterprise risks 
• No external coordination and collaboration 
Risk Informed 
• Local risk management processes 
• Local awareness on enterprise risks, with limited information sharing 
across enterprise 
• Limited external coordination and collaboration 
Repeatable 
• Enterprise-wide risk management policy and processes 
• Enterprise-wide awareness of risks, with effective processes and 
personnel 
• Robust external coordination and collaboration on cybersecurity risks 
Adaptive 
• Cybersecurity practices adapt via lessons learned and predictive 
indicators 
• Enterprise culture of risk management with high awareness of 
environment 
• Proactive coordination and collaboration on cybersecurity risks 
  
NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions 
Function Characteristic 
Identify Understand and manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities 
Protect Safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services 
Detect Activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event 
Respond Activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event 
Recover Activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore capabilities/services impaired due to a cybersecurity event 
Figure 6.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework Tiers and Functions81 
  
                                                 
81 Ibid., 8–11. 
 33 
This framework encourages planned and well-resourced cybersecurity efforts, but 
falls short in fully integrating cyber threat intelligence. In an assessment of the 
framework conducted by PwC, they indicated that the framework “does not address the 
need to implement processes to identify and understand an organization’s unique threat 
adversaries, their motivations, their capabilities, and the data they target.”82 
2. Automated Indicator Sharing 
DHS, through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC), established the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program to encourage real-
time sharing of threat information between participants, which include federal, state, 
local, tribal, territorial, information sharing and analysis centers; private companies; and 
foreign partners.83 AIS is built upon two complementary technical specifications 
developed internationally through community-driven collaboration, for the purpose of 
information sharing about cyber threats, situational awareness, and the defense of 
networks.84 
One of these specifications is TAXII, which is an acronym for the Trusted 
Automated eXchange of Indicator Information, designed to facilitate the exchange of 
cyber threat information.85 It is a framework to provide services, messaging and 
protocols, querying, and content categories.86 The other specification is STIX, which is a 
structured language to convey the full range of cyber threat information. Examples 
include the analysis of threats, incidents, indicators, patterns of behavior, defensive 
response to threats, adversaries, and adversarial efforts.87 To use an analogy around 
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human language, TAXII is the phone and the voice networks we use to communicate, 
inclusive of services to connect people together; STIX is English, and all the rules that 
govern forming comprehensible phrases and sentences. 
There has been some concern expressed over AIS, citing potential issues with 
customer privacy, PII leakage, unwanted scrutiny into vulnerabilities within participant 
networks, and potential legal liability.88 Participation in AIS by private industry is also 
discretionary, both at the organizational and incident level. The timeliness and 
completeness of information can therefore not be assured. 
3. Continuous Diagnosis and Mitigation 
DHS also developed Continuous Diagnosis and Monitoring (CDM), an 
implementation of the NIST framework principles that charts a three-pronged strategy. 
The first prong is to harden the components throughout a network by authorizing and 
managing all capacity, capability, and users. The second is automated scanning of all 
managed devices and activities to provide more timely and enhanced situational 
awareness of security vulnerabilities throughout the network. The third is maturation of 
processes and tools to aid decision makers in their efforts to prioritize issues and 
mitigation strategies. When implemented, CDM provides cyber security professionals a 
comprehensive solution to manage cyber assets (see Figure 7). CDM is mandated for 
federal departments and agencies, and available for use by state, local, tribal, and 
territorial governments. As a program, it consists of a modernized security framework, a 
suite of over 300 commercial off-the-shelf technologies, and an acquisition tool to 
streamline purchasing and reduce costs.89 
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Figure 7.  CDM Operational Model90 
CDM’s framework provides for an extensible security architecture. While it is 
fully defined by fifteen core functions, it has been segmented into three phases so it can 
be implemented over time.91 Phase One focuses on cyber assets, both physical and 
logical, and addresses the issue of hardening individual devices. It includes identification 
of known malware instances, device configuration management, and introduction of new 
hardware and software into the environment. Phase Two focuses on the business 
processes and people the network serves. It manages access to accounts, services, and 
information available to authorized users, and identifies anomalies, flagging potential 
accidental, reckless, and malicious behaviors by insiders Phase Three addresses processes 
and practices to optimally manage the security life cycle of the network, including 
response to incidents. Phase Three accounts for the an organization’s constantly changing 
environment, and changes to the systems that support the organization. As new business 
requirements are identified—then engineered into capabilities, capacity, processes, and 
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information resources—Phase Three integrates the requirements into the existing 
management structure established in Phases One and Two. Phase Three also builds a 
more robust, cohesive ability to plan, detect, and respond when things go wrong.  
Similar to continuous monitoring, CDM has been criticized for being focused on 
vulnerabilities instead of threats, and offering an incomplete solution.92 It also aims for a 
full three days from initiating a search for vulnerabilities to addressing them, which can 
be a very long time when an adversary is actively exploiting a network. 
4. Active Cyber Defense 
Consistent with its conceived use for national defense, the United States 
Department of Defense (DOD) proposed Active Cyber Defense (ACD) and described it 
within the 2011 DOD Strategy for Operations in Cyberspace. The objective of ACD is to 
seize initiative from the attacker. DOD described ACD as “synchronized real-time 
capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. It builds 
on traditional approaches to defending DOD networks and systems, supplementing best 
practices with new operating concepts. It operates at network speed by using sensors, 
software, and intelligence to detect and stop malicious activity before it can affect DOD 
networks and systems.”93 The strategy assumes that ACD will need to extend beyond a 
defender’s network boundaries, with activities to understand the various threats to DOD 
networks.94 The concept has been further developed by the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) Information Assurance Directorate (IAD), in which they defined six functional 
areas of ACD: 
• Sensing—ability to monitor network environment, states, and behaviors; 
• Sense-Making—analytics to understand events within context; 
• Decision Making—reducing and evaluating response choices, and 
selecting the best option 
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• Acting—affecting the selected choice, manually or automated; 
• Messaging/Control—communication and coordination of shared 
situational awareness and responses; 
• ACD Mission Management—operational control of any particular 
instance of an ACD implementation.95 
Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between the first five functional areas (the sixth, ACD 
Mission Management, is not displayed as it is implementation dependent). 
 
Figure 8.  NSA/IAD’s ACD Conceptual Architecture96 
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Those in the private sector have looked to leverage ACD concepts. Industry 
experts have not fully accepted the DOD’s definition of ACD because of their own 
desires to mold the capability to non-defense purposes, despite the absence of legal 
authorities, protections, and obligations of sovereign nations. Emilio Iasiello, chief of 
threat analysis at iSIGHT Partners, argues there is no internationally agreed-upon 
definition of ACD.97 A review of literature across academia, legal experts, industry 
experts, and government officials shows key characteristics of ACD applicable to private 
use. These characteristics are: 
• is triggered by a malicious attack, 
• involves knowledge of the defenders environment, 
• provides mechanism for “near” real-time response, and 
• provides mechanisms to respond, both internally and externally, to the 
defender’s network.98 
ACD techniques are built upon use of deception, disinformation, misdirection, delaying, 
deflection, attribution, degradation, and destruction.99 Many of these have been 
researched and implemented into various tools available for private use. Within a 
defended network, available ACD tools include honeypots, honey patching, honeynets, 
honey files, decoys, tar pits, beacons, and traffic deflection. External to a defended 
network, the tools include deployment of remote access Trojans and other one-off 
hacking techniques to obtain information from, and possibly unauthorized access to, 
attacking systems.100 
Significant challenges constrain private use of ACD techniques. Accurate 
identification of attackers remains an analytical art, complicating the decision of which 
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external systems to exploit when going after an attacker.101 Further, the underlying back-
and-forth between attackers and defenders requires constant innovation. Tools quickly 
become obsolete, requiring frequent and expensive reengineering. Additionally, lack of 
concise cyber laws and precedence has prevented consensus on the legality of its private 
use. The uncertainty of legality is expressed as opinion on the likelihood of criminal or 
civil liability for those engaged in ACD, with low risk for use of techniques within a 
defended network and high risk for use of techniques external to a defended network.102 
Further, the use of ACD techniques may result in individuals running afoul of 
professional ethics codes within the legal and cybersecurity fields.103 Finally, external 
ACD techniques have a high likelihood of infringing upon the sovereign rights of nations, 
and may trigger geopolitical escalations with unintended consequences.104 
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IV. AUTOMATED DEFENSE OF CYBER SYSTEMS 
[The next innovation regarding cybersecurity is] automating cybersecurity 
capabilities. Our networks and data are subject to continuous cyberattacks 
from a wide range of threats. Effective defenses against these adversaries 
include real-time, complex synchronization of thousands of endpoints and 
networks, multiple organizational processes, and the selection, de-
confliction, and execution of complex response actions within and across 
diverse domains. 
—Curt Dukes, NSA/IAD Director 
 
As previously argued, today’s cybersecurity models and efforts will not be 
sufficient to address tomorrow’s exponentially larger networks and corresponding 
vulnerabilities. The rate at which critical infrastructure, corporations, and citizens 
integrate IoT devices will upend current practices. However, it is possible to take today’s 
concepts to build a more effective, scalable cybersecurity model. It requires tying 
cybersecurity to the same exponential growth curve as the technology it is bound to 
protect. This means responding to threats in cyber time, not human time, while avoiding 
offensive tools that may antagonize sovereign nations. Innovations are occurring that will 
propel automated solutions forward, and will come together into what is put suggested in 
this paper as automated defense of cyber systems (ADCS). 
A. DEFINING ADCS 
1. Automation 
The definition of automation is fairly straightforward: “the technique, method, or 
system of operating or controlling a process by highly automatic (having the capability of 
starting, operating, moving, etc., independently) means, as by electronic devices, 
reducing human intervention to a minimum.”105 When applied to Director Curt Dukes’ 
quote that opened this chapter, automating cyber defenses envisions protecting the 
networks and data from continuous attacks. Furthermore, the endpoints within networks 
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matter—the individual devices are interconnected with each other, and these devices and 
networks support a variety of business operations critical for achieving an organization’s 
mission. Automation includes assessing impact of deploying available defensive options 
on both the attacker and the defended network.  
The timeframe for automation is “real-time,” which is often quoted by 
cybersecurity experts. Don Adams, vice president and chief technology officer for 
TIBCO Software Federal, described a need to manage “real-time events from distributed 
sensors, agents and other processing components.”106 An analogous term is “cyber-
relevant time.”107 The use of real and cyber-relevant time connotes that actions and 
reactions in cyberspace are the result of computation using algorithms, rather than 
application of human logic and judgement.108 It does not imply instantaneous or 
immediate action. It is the amount of time necessary, which will vary depending upon an 
organization’s mission, to support resiliency and smooth degradation such that defenders 
retain operational control over the defended devices and network. 
Finally, the human is not completely removed from cybersecurity. Rather, 
automation is used to build a baseline of system-managed knowledge for use by 
cybersecurity professionals. The baseline of knowledge includes an understanding of the 
data traversing a network, devices and networks to be protected, knowledge of how 
business processes support business operations, means to measure and assess business 
operations, knowledge of what defensive options are available, and an ability to assess 
probable impact of defensive options on business operations. 
2. ADCS Core Components 
Future cybersecurity models must benefit from anticipated advancements in 
computational power and algorithms for the purpose of abstracting network and device 
complexity. Therefore, ADCS will build on top of advances in today’s models and efforts 
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that take advantage of enhanced structuring of information that currently feed human-
driven processes. This will free cybersecurity professionals from the minutia of 
individual device management, allowing them to instead focus on supporting 
organizational objectives and resolving unanticipated cyber crises. 
B. SENSORS 
We have five senses—sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch—to help us 
comprehend the world. ADCS will have senses as well, except many more than a person. 
Some of the ADCS senses will correlate to those possessed by humans while others will 
capture measurements relevant to cyber systems, such as network data flow. Others still 
will be geared toward measuring the operational mission of the network. 
All of these senses will contribute to automated decision making. The importance 
of reading sensors and responding to them within automated cybersecurity systems was 
recognized in 2004 when two Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
members prototyped an autonomic defensive system, using the sensors to “repeatedly 
report on the presence or absence of normal or intrusive activity.”109 
1. The Sensing Device 
Future sensors will have greater capability and autonomy than today’s devices, 
enabled through miniaturization, self-power, and wireless communication. This will 
allow for their use in almost any conceivable environment enhanced through data 
processing. 
Miniaturization is the ultimate win-win for electronics, as it allows for increased 
computational capacity at reduced power consumption. In the book One-Dimensional 
Metals, Sigmar Roth and David Carroll projected the minimum feature size of electronic 
components using a Moore plot. Examining transistor density, the book traced 
miniaturization from vacuum electronics, through solid-state, microelectronics, to VLSI 
(very large scale integration). The authors’ projection culminates in the achievement of 
                                                 
109 O. Patrick Kreidl and Tiffany M. Frazier, “Feedback Control Applied to Survivability: A Host-
Based Autonomic Defense System,” IEEE transactions on Reliability 53, no. 1 (2004): 149. 
 44 
molecular electronics around the year 2020. The book also describes the technological 
challenges toward transitioning to the molecular level. While the realization of molecular 
transistors may not occur by 2020, the authors draw a plausible path for continued 
improvements.110 
Dependence on reliable and continuous power further limits mass deployment of 
sensors. Unfortunately, the pace of battery development is frequently sighted as lagging 
the timescale described in Moore’s Law.111 Rather than relying on a slower-moving 
technology requiring recharge, advancements are being made in self-powered devices. In 
research conducted in 2003, two prototype systems were successfully developed using 
vibration-based magnetic coil generators, although the prototypes were large and 
clunky.112 More recent work conducted in China prototyped self-powered smart skin, 
capable of detecting contact location and velocity, and sensitive enough to “perceive the 
perturbation of a honey bee,” all on a 1.9 mm deep device.113 
A research group from the Georgia Institute of Technology’s School of Material 
Science described its wireless nanotechnology goal as “aiming at building a self-powered 
system that operates independently, sustainably, and wirelessly by itself without using a 
battery.”114 Their tests demonstrated a device capable of transmitting within a range of 
five to ten feet, with signals detectable using commercial radios.115 Range limitations can 
be overcome through current protocols, such as Bluetooth, allowing signal retransmission 
over longer distances.116 
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2. Sensor Arrays 
Equally important to individual sensor development is the ability for a large 
number of sensors to work in aggregate to develop high-resolution information. A group 
from the University of Texas Electrical Engineering Department demonstrated a 
massively-deployable architecture of sensor nodes, each capable of up to thirty-one 
distinct sensing capabilities. Similar to the wireless capabilities described in the previous 
section, the sensor array utilized low-power Bluetooth to wirelessly transmit to a base 
station, with the data transmitted over the internet and stored in the cloud.117 
An advantage of large sensor arrays is that they are fault tolerant when one sensor 
fails. The readings of a particular sensor can be assessed relative to its neighbors to come 
to a judgment about the sensor’s reliability. A 2006 research project utilized evolvable 
hardware (EHW), which applies genetic algorithms to programmable portions of the 
hardware. In the project, EHW was used to allow for autonomous reprogramming once a 
sensor fault was detected. This allowed for the removal of a node without human 
intervention, and without significantly detracting from measurement accuracy.118 
3. Data Collection and Aggregation 
The mass promulgation of sensors will inevitably result in data stores that are in 
orders of magnitude larger than they are today. Research on data from ambient assisted 
living communication (AAL) described this as a threefold problem: volume—large and/
or computationally heavy data sets; velocity—the rate at which data flow through the 
data store; and variety—the range of types and sources of data.119 The solution proposed 
in the research is the use of metric space–based big data abstraction for computationally 
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simpler analysis. The key is in engineering algorithms in which resulting data patterns 
could be recognized and understood.120 
C. AUTONOMIC COMPUTING 
When applied to cybersecurity, the goal of autonomic computing is development 
of technology to manage technology, abstracting a system’s complexity while ensuring 
optimal performance.121 IBM released a blueprint for a system and described four key 
attributes for autonomic computing.: self-configuring—dynamic adaptation to the 
environment; self-healing—discover, diagnose, and react to disruptions; self-
optimizing—monitor and tune performance; and self-protecting—anticipate, detect, and 
counter all source threats.122 A potential future for these four attributes is described in the 
following sections. 
1. Self-Configuring, Healing, and Optimizing 
In their review of over 1,100 articles about autonomic systems, Muccini, Sharaf, 
and Weyns found that the top priorities of autonomic research are efficiency/performance 
(i.e., self-optimizing), flexibility and reliability (i.e., self-healing), and configurability 
(i.e., self-configuring). Proposed autonomic solutions existed across the TCP/IP stack, 
with most existing at the application layer. A drawback identified by the review was that 
relatively few articles identified cybersecurity as the primary focus.123 
In prototyping an autonomic architecture, Kreidl and Frazier defined four key 
architectural elements: the information system (i.e., host or device) to be protected, a set 
of sensors, a set of actuators capable of responding with various defensive mechanisms, 
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and a controller to analyze and coordinate the sensors and actuators toward host 
survivability.124 
Autonomic computing extends beyond the device, and must be able to handle 
increases in size, complexity, and topography of a network. It begins with an automated 
understanding of connected devices, their capabilities, and the communication channels 
that make up the whole. In a 2014 study of industrial control network awareness, 
Vollmer, Manic, and Linda developed a discovery mechanism they called Network Entity 
Identification (NEI). It used sensors to passively monitor network traffic for the purpose 
of identifying connected devices as well as correlating the logical and physical device 
addresses.125 A more comprehensive solution will discover and catalog device 
capabilities, correlating them to business functions served by a network. With this in 
place, cybersecurity professionals will no longer manage the minutia of securing 
individual devices. 
2. Self-Protecting 
The defining characteristics of a self-protecting device, as suggested by Inderpreet 
Chopra in his dissertation, are that it can “proactively detect and identify hostile behavior 
and can take autonomous actions to defend itself.”126 Chopra goes on to define a 
classification for a grid security system, identifying a hierarchy of attacks across the 
system, management, and network layers. He then describes various available techniques 
and algorithms, and proposes methods to detect and respond to such attacks across the 
system, management, and network levels.127 
In 2016, four researchers at the University of Toronto published an article on 
Talos, a system designed to rapidly respond to coding flaws. A common line of threat for 
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systems is the pre-patch window of vulnerability where a specific vulnerability is 
identified and made public, but no fix is available.128 What the University of Toronto 
researchers tested was a mechanism to trigger preexisting error-handling within 
vulnerable sections of code, thereby avoiding its execution and potential exploitation.129 
The mechanism demonstrated an ability to safely neutralize three-quarters of all potential 
vulnerabilities tested.130 While this did result in loss of functionality, in most cases it was 
in non-critical portions of the software and did not prevent the product from performing 
its primary purpose.131 When combined with a sensing network, this technique could be 
integrated and deployed as one of multiple options to mitigate a threat attempting to 
manifest itself on a device. 
An example of a self-protection mechanism beyond a single device is the 
automated creation of internal decoys and disinformation in response to a cyber attack. 
The idea is that an autonomic system could handle the complexity of extending the 
defended network by creating realistic and compartmentalized segments. The intent 
would be to distract, confuse, and mitigate the efforts of the attacker. Jonathan Voris, Jill 
Jermyn, Nathanial Boggs, and Salvatore Stolfo prototyped a technique to automate the 
deployment of decoy files within a network, verifying that the system was as effective as 
manual generation and placement of such files.132 In the study cited in the previous 
section, Vollmer, Manic, and Linda integrated a dynamic honeypot defense and 
demonstrated a capability to “automatically deploy deceptive virtual network entities” for 
the purpose of luring those conducting a cyber attack.133 
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D. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Tim Urban, a prolific writer on the topic of AI, divides AI’s evolution into three 
tiers. The first is Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), described as specialization in one 
area, but not extendable or applicable in other domains (like asking a self-driving car to 
play chess, which it would never learn to do). The second, Artificial General Intelligence 
(AGI), possesses a capability on par with human intelligence; it can be given any task, 
and incorporates the ability to reason, abstract, and learn from experience. The third, 
Artificial Superintelligence, is the creation of an intellect superior to humans, and is the 
type of AI that generates the greatest speculation on existential impact, positive or 
negative.134 
This thesis focuses on potential solutions in the ANI space. ANI is the area of AI 
where innovations are already available today, and where rapid growth over the next ten 
to fifteen years is most likely to occur. 
1. Machine Learning 
Machine learning is a sub-domain of AI that automates the process of “getting 
computers to act without being programmed,” and incorporates training techniques both 
supervised and unsupervised by humans.135 The technology has been applied to problem 
solving in a number of areas, a few of which include face detection, identification of 
topics within articles, and medical diagnosis.136 
Northrup Grumman developed a system called BluVector, designed to utilize 
machine learning to better detect and classify malicious software in real-time operating in 
a network.137 An independent test of BluVector’s efficacy, conducted by Miercom, 
achieved malware detection rates between 99 and 100 percent across multiple tests, and 
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was complementary to BluVector’s logging system and how it can be used in threat 
remediation.138 Crowdstrike has introduced a similar system called Falcon Host, a 
product with its own machine learning algorithms.139 A challenge for unsupervised 
machine learning is false-positive rate, which rises with detection rate and is a source of 
great frustration to defenders by mixing real attacks with suspect but innocuous events. 
To address this, a group from MIT developed the AI2 platform, which combines 
supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques. Analyzing 3.6 billion log 
lines, the system was able to achieve a cyber attack detection rate of greater than 86 
percent while reducing the rate of false positives by 500 percent.140 
2. Situational Awareness 
One of the challenges in today’s cyberspace environment is building situational 
awareness, which Endsley describes as “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of the status in the near future.”141 MITRE goes on to describe three sub-
domains of cyber situational awareness: network, threat, and mission awareness. These in 
turn feed into providing a tactical, operational, and strategic outlook for decision 
making.142 
Because of the overwhelming amount of information to consider, the problem 
space requires computational assistance to collate and synthesize in a timely manner. In a 
2014 literature review of cyber situational awareness, Franke and Brynielsson identified 
102 articles dedicated to building cyber situational awareness. Of those, they found 45 
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with an empirical contribution, described as having “results based on data from 
experiments or archival studies, but also e.g., mathematical proofs, results from 
simulations, informed reasoning about computational complexity etc.”143 Further, 33 of 
those articles contained ideas for design and implementation. This demonstrates potential 
for significant advancement of ANI situational awareness tools for network defense. 
3. Dealing with Uncertainty 
As inter- and intra-network complexity increases, wicked problems will present 
themselves with greater frequency. A cyber attack and corresponding defensive 
cybersecurity response, whether performed manually or automated, may upset the 
homeostatic state of a network. ADCS needs to measure and assess the effects of attacker 
and defender actions, which include actual and relative changes in network status and 
their impact on supported business processes.   
In a 2015 article, Zoubin Chahramani from the University of Cambridge 
described a framework utilizing probabilistic modeling applied to machine learning, with 
a goal of allowing computers to learn from observing data made available to them. 
However, data by nature is incomplete, either due to a lack of collection or granularity. 
Machine learning relies on making assumptions, or inferences, about unobserved data 
from the observed data, and the collection of assumptions is represented in a model. 
Uncertainty is the expression of that model’s inability to accurately predict unobserved 
data. Probabilistic modeling captures and accounts for all uncertainty within a model 
using probabilistic distributions, and “learns” through the use of Bayesian learning to 
adjust the distribution after observing new data.144 
4. Human Analogy 
An analogy of ADCS to human biology is made to illustrate the relationship of 
the ADCS components to the desired cybersecurity capability. The analogy has been 
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frequently used in the literature to address complexity and visualize solutions. In a 2009 
IEEE article, the autonomous nervous system was used as a model to build a 
cybersecurity architecture. It accounted for sympathetic (unconscious) and 
parasympathetic (conscious) actions, which sometimes conflict with each other but are 
complementary toward achieving homeostasis in protecting the body.145 For example, the 
body unconsciously breathes, but breathing can be controlled when it can be harmful, 
such as when one is underwater or in a smoke-filled room. 
In ADCS, sympathetic actions are automated while parasympathetic actions are 
controlled by cybersecurity professionals. The ADCS components make up the lower- 
and higher-order elements of a complex system, much like nerves and organs make up 
the body. ADCS is self-contained in that the defensive mechanisms are focused internal 
to the defended network. The concept of an internally defended network was introduced 
by Dr. Kristopher Hall when he built and tested Rx, a cyber security system to mitigate 
threats from internet worms. Rx looked at cyber security threats as a disease, and used 
concepts from biological epidemiology to internally treat them.146 
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V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis began by considering if automated cyber defense promises to be more 
effective than current models in coping with anticipated exponential growth of IoT 
devices and vulnerabilities, and subsequently examined relevant literature. An affirmative 
response was validated through the examination of the present and future cybersecurity 
landscape. 
The IoT wave began in earnest in the early part of the current decade, and there is 
no reason to believe it will abate from exponential growth. Additionally, the internet has 
shown to be inherently insecure since its inception, with new vulnerabilities introduced 
and identified on a regular basis. Terrorism, nation states, and organized crime will 
continue to be the three primary malicious actors, and the level of threat from them may 
even grow as the cost to conduct offensive cyber operations drops while the cost to 
defend increases. Consequently, there will be a greater surface area with vulnerabilities 
exploitable by those motivated to attack. 
Defensive models have evolved since the inception of the internet, beginning with 
a simplistic exterior network defense, progressing to layered, ever vigilant, and 
intelligence driven. Both industry and government have adapted to increasingly complex 
networks, setting frameworks for establishing defensive efforts, exchanging attack 
intelligence, and moving toward partial automation. Broad use of external/offensive 
cyber operations is not viable, particularly by private industry, as it has high business and 
professional risks, introduces the potential for criminal liability, and may lead to 





Greater automation is viewed as the future of cyber defense. Numerous 
technological advantages are on the near-to-mid horizon to help perform many 
cybersecurity functions. They will take advantage of the same exponential growth curve 
as seen in the introduction of IoT devices, thereby allowing a slowly growing number of 
cybersecurity professionals to defend vastly larger and more complex networks. 
A vast decrease in price with corresponding increase in computational power will 
be the driving force behind mass deployment of internet-enabled sensors. This will make 
a sea of data available for use by automated cyber defensive systems that are capable of 
responding at both the device and network level. These sensors will feed into AI systems 
tuned to maximize the performance of the network while handling configuration, healing, 
optimization, and protection activities under most circumstances. Cybersecurity 
professionals will remain involved by monitoring and tuning AI systems, and to step in 
when circumstances arise that cannot be handled by automated systems. The automation 
and abstraction provided by ADCS will allow private industry to limit the number of 
cybersecurity professionals they will need to hire. The skillset and experience required by 
cybersecurity professionals will increase, as they will be expected to understand 
defensive AI systems as well as modeling of business functions supported by networks.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The realization of ADCS will not take place overnight. It is much more likely it 
will arrive piecemeal, with incremental improvements to the sensor, autonomic, and AI 
components.  
National policy should continue to encourage investment in the broad use of 
defensive cyber automation. Such automation should be limited to activities contained 
within a defender’s network, and should not include offensive cyber measures in which 
the CIA triad is compromised without authorization. The reasons are threefold. First, 
offensive cyber measures introduce unacceptable risk to the businesses and individuals 
conducting the offensive operations. Second, the actions performed will likely be 
transnational, may not reflect the will or interests of the United States, and will not have 
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the same accountability to the governed as cyber actions initiated by the government. 
Third, automated cyber attacks beyond human control, even for defensive purposes, may 
result in magnified real-world consequences that are rapidly escalated and unintended. 
When considering incremental improvements from today’s cyber security 
environment, a logical first step is to provide the advantages of CDM to private industry. 
While the U.S. government provides some incentive through mandating adoption and use 
by executive agencies, private industry represents the greatest source of funding available 
to encourage more research and faster product development. Further, private industry’s 
use and contribution to cyber vulnerability and threat information sharing is critical, and 
barriers to participation in the Automated Indicator Sharing program should be 
aggressively removed, whether through incentives, regulatory control, or mitigation of 
civil liability. 
Finally, organizations should develop an investment strategy in building sensor 
networks that support operations. This encompasses evaluation and iteration of data 
useful for collection. Likewise, they should invest in development and maturation of 
computational models that capture business functions. Rather than trying to model entire 
systems, such development should be incremental, focusing on the most critical business 
processes, data sets, or network segments. This, in turn, will feed into improvements in 
automation. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future areas for research toward ADCS realization are plentiful. Unexplored, but 
implied and interrelated to the benefits of ADCS, are the mitigation of non-malicious 
cyber disruptions, which can include such things as hardware, software, and human 
operator failures. Benefits of system reliability and resiliency may prove to be far greater 
for non-malicious incidents than for malicious ones. 
While the paper evaluated the vulnerabilities and threats faced by cyber networks 
through the introduction of vulnerabilities by IoT devices, the complexity of cyber-
physical systems (CPS) and their impact on social networks was not explored. It is highly 
likely that future networks will support CPS, and successful cyber attacks may 
 56 
increasingly cause non-virtual effects experienced by more people. This may alter the 
consequence piece of the risk calculus, and potentially support more urgent action on 
cyber defense. 
This thesis did not consider the use of non-cyber deterrents to malicious activity. 
Anecdotal observations from recent legal actions by the U.S. Department of Justice 
against PRC and Iranian cyber actors suggest an evolution of state-sponsored activities. A 
targeted study of state behavior pre- and post-indictment would be of interest toward 
understanding the evolution of threat actor motivations. The indictments may also be 
influencing how states view norms of cyber behavior, which have yet to crystalize into 
formal agreements of treaties. 
Finally, this thesis speculated on only a few technologies that may shape the 
cybersecurity environment. There are undoubtedly more techniques and algorithms 
beyond sensors, autonomics, and AI that will emerge as viable cybersecurity solutions 
over the next ten to fifteen years. 
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